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The power of the electorate to reward or to punish governments for their per-
formance is one of the pillars of conventional democratic theory, with economic 
perceptions as one of the most important issues for the public opinion. Howev-
er, there is an ongoing debate over whether causality also flows the other way. 
This article aims to test whether partisanship shapes economic perceptions 
while extending the argument to the context of a developing economy. Further-
more, it analyses the impact of not only the direction of partisanship but also 
it’s strength, an overlooked feature in the partisan bias literature. The analysis, 
which aggregates an unusually rich data set of Uruguayans’ economic evalua-
tions for the 2001-2019 period, presents strong evidence for the argument that 
both the direction and strength of partisanship produce great bias in economic 
judgments even in a developing economy context where citizens are more vul-
nerable to economic shocks. These findings suggest a rather unsettling scenario 
for electoral accountability in a significant part of the Uruguayan electorate.
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El poder del electorado para recompensar o castigar a los gobiernos por su 
desempeño es uno de los pilares de la teoría democrática convencional, y las 
percepciones económicas son uno de los temas más importantes para la opin-
ión pública. Sin embargo, hay un debate en curso sobre si la causalidad también 
funciona en sentido contrario. Este artículo tiene como objetivo probar si el 
partidismo da forma a las percepciones económicas, al tiempo que extiende el 
debate a un contexto de economía en desarrollo. Además, analiza el impacto no 
sólo de la dirección del partidismo, sino también su fuerza, una característica 
que se pasa por alto en la literatura de sesgo partidista. El análisis, que agrega 
un conjunto de datos inusualmente rico de las evaluaciones económicas de los 
uruguayos para el período 2001-2019, presenta una fuerte evidencia del argu-
mento de que tanto la dirección como la fuerza del partidismo producen un gran 
sesgo en los juicios económicos, incluso en un contexto de economía en desar-
rollo donde los ciudadanos son más vulnerables a los shocks económicos. Estos 
hallazgos sugieren un escenario bastante inquietante para la rendición de cuen-









O poder do eleitorado de recompensar ou punir os governos por seu desempe-
nho é um dos pilares da teoria democrática convencional, sendo as percepções 
sobre a economia uma das questões mais importantes para a opinião pública. 
No entanto, há um debate em andamento sobre se a causalidade também flui 
para o outro lado. Este artigo tem como objetivo testar se o partidarismo molda 
as percepções econômicas enquanto estende o argumento para um contexto 
econômico em desenvolvimento. Além disso, analisa o impacto não apenas da 
direção partidária, mas também de sua força, uma característica negligenciada 
na literatura de viés partidário. A análise, que agrega um conjunto de dados inco-
mumente rico das avaliações econômicas uruguaias para o período 2001-2019, 
apresenta fortes evidências a favor do argumento que tanto a direção quanto a 
força partidária produzem um grande viés nos julgamentos econômicos, mesmo 
em um contexto econômico em desenvolvimento onde os cidadãos estão mais 
vulneráveis a choques econômicos. Essas descobertas sugerem um cenário bas-
tante perturbador para a prestação de contas eleitoral em uma parte significati-
va do eleitorado uruguaio.
INTRODUCTION
One of the key aspects of a well-functioning democracy is electoral account-
ability: the power of the electorate to hold politicians accountable for the govern-
ment’s performance. In this regard, no issue is as important to public opinion as 
the economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000); several studies have established 
a causal link between economic performance and election outcomes (e.g., Kramer, 
1971). Nonetheless, recent research has shown that the causal relationship be-
tween economic perceptions and political behavior is not as straightforward as 
once thought. In contrast with classic democratic theory, there is evidence that 
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individuals tend to underline information that is consistent with their previous be-
liefs (such as partisanship) and disregard dissonant information (e.g., Bartels, 2002; 
Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). However, some gaps in understanding remain around the 
questions of when and how the political conditioning of economic perceptions 
operates. In the first place, this phenomenon has been mainly studied in the USA 
and the UK, both of which are developed countries with relatively mild economic 
cycles. Within this context, Uruguay presents an intriguing case for testing the ar-
gument and addressing this shortcoming for several reasons. Firstly, the lack of re-
search on partisan bias in Latin America and outside advanced industrial democra-
cies necessitates scholarly attention to such regions. Secondly, although Uruguay 
has the highest level of partisanship in Latin America (Cohen et al., 2017), its vul-
nerability to exogenous economic shocks as a price-taking economy challenges the 
argument of the political conditioning of economic judgments. Intuitively, unstable 
economies tend to generate reasonable responses that are not powerfully affected 
by partisanship (Evans and Andersen, 2006). Lastly, the time-series analysis was 
drawn from an extraordinarily rich set of data with bimonthly face to face surveys 
– with representative samples of the Uruguayan population – for an uninterrupted 
period of almost 20 years with significant economic and political changes.
In the second place, existing specialized literature tends to overlook how par-
tisan bias operates in relation to the strength of partisanship. We know little about 
whether partisan bias operates only among strong identifiers or if leaners are also 
significantly biased. To be sure, these relationships must be uncovered to under-
stand the normative consequences of this phenomenon – if partisan bias is con-
fined only to a small part of the electorate (strong identifiers) but does not operate 
among other partisans, then the negative normative consequences of partisan bias 
would apply only to a relatively small proportion of the electorate.
Responding to these gaps in the scholarly archive, this article tests the effect of 
partisan bias – of both partisanship direction and strength – on economic percep-
tions to shed light on the current debate. I find robust evidence that, even in a volatile 
economic context, party identification and the strength of attachment significantly 
affect how individuals form their views of a country’s economic performance. Time-
series data shows that no matter how prosperous or disastrous the state of a coun-
try’s economy – notably, between 2001 and 2019 Uruguay experienced a devastat-
ing economic crisis and then enjoyed unprecedented growth – individuals identified 
with the party in office will hold a significantly better economic perception than op-
position partisans. In addition, a set of ordered logit models with time fixed effects 
were used to estimate the significance and magnitude of differences among partisan 
directions and strengths. I find strong evidence that partisans of the same party usu-
ally hold significantly different economic perceptions depending on the strength of 
their attachment. Furthermore, my results shed light on the possible non-linear ef-
fects of partisan bias among different levels of partisanship strength.
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ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION
The importance of economic perceptions lies not only in their obvious economic 
consequences, but also in their political implications. As Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
(2000, p. 211) posit: «among the issues on the typical voter’s agenda, none are more 
consistently present, nor generally has a stronger impact, than the economy». The 
literature on the linkages between economic perceptions and political behavior pre-
sents an ongoing debate. On the one hand, classic economic vote theory argues that 
good economic performance benefits the incumbent party whereas bad economic 
performances increases the likelihood of opposition candidates to win the election 
(Kinder and Kiewet, 1981; Lewis Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). This view assumes that 
economic perceptions are a straightforward response to economic performance, 
and it focuses on which voter economic perception – pocketbook or sociotropic, for 
instance – has a stronger effect on the vote (Wilcox and Wlezien, 1993).
On the other hand, a revisionist body of literature suggests that these studies 
tend to underestimate the political roots of economic perceptions. This view main-
tains that the public’s understanding of economic variables is limited and strongly 
influenced by political variables, mainly party identification (Evans and Andersen, 
2006). Evidence (both observational and experimental) supporting this causal 
reversion has proliferated recently (e.g., Evans and Andersen, 2006; Tilley and 
Hobolt, 2011; Anson, 2016). For instance, Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000) con-
clude that economic perceptions vary systematically with information, media ex-
posure, political attitudes and demographic characteristics. All these results arise 
from Campbell et al.’s (1960; p. 133) conception of the role of partisan loyalties: 
«Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual 
tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation».
Furthermore, the literature has shown that party identification constitutes an 
emotional attachment to a party, often acquired in childhood or early adulthood 
(Campbell et al, 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). This revisionist lit-
erature resumes the paradigm of partisanship as an «unmoved mover», and clearly 
points out the endogeneity between economic perceptions and political behavior. 
The outcome implies an overestimation of the role of economic perceptions as a 
cause of presidential or party choices in opposition to what economic vote theory 
proponents had established. The naïve conception of voters as «myopic automa-
tons whose support for the president’s party rises and falls with economic perfor-
mance», as Rudolph describes it (2003; p. 699), is replaced by a frame in which vot-
ers do not exactly respond to facts alone, but rather seek to reconcile the facts with 
their previous political beliefs (Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).
Not only the direction of party identifications matter but also the strength 
of the attachment. As early as Campbell et al. (1960; p. 122) study viewed parti-
sanship as a continuum extending across different intensities. However, recent 
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literature evidencing the political conditioning of economic perceptions generally 
overlooks the partisan strength factor, with most studies dividing the electorate 
into government partisans, opposition partisans, and Independents, failing to con-
trast effects among the different partisans of the same party but with different 
intensities. Furthermore, studies that situate partisanship as a continuum usually 
do not offer specific estimates of each partisan group but instead tend to estimate 
linear effects (a notable exception to this is Bartels (2002)). Thus, adding partisan 
strength to the equation allows for a more nuanced picture of the extent of parti-
san bias and possible non-linear effects. In particular, this approach tests Campbell 
et al.’s (1960; p. 133) argument that «The stronger the party bond, the more exag-
gerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be».
THE URUGUAYAN CASE
National economic perceptions are a relevant issue in Latin American political 
behavior, as several works suggest the existence of sociotropic economic voting 
(Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013; Singer and Carlin, 2013). However, Latin America 
remains mostly unexplored regarding the influence of partisanship on economic 
perceptions except for Visconti (2017) and Samuels and Zucco’s (2018) work. Vis-
conti’s (2017) article provides evidence from observational data of partisan bias 
in economic perceptions in two minor Brazilian cities. Samuels and Zucco’s (2018) 
work is the only one that employs an experimental design, which showed Brazil-
ian partisans engage in motivated reasoning while evaluating the economy when 
presented economic information with partisan cues. With evidence of this phe-
nomenon confined almost exclusively to the USA and UK, the argument remains 
untested for different economies and institutional settings.
While Lupu (2015) provided strong evidence that partisanship in Latin Amer-
ica resembles that of advanced democracies, there are reasons to think that is not 
the case for the construction of economic perceptions. The rationale for this is that 
partisan bias in economic perceptions is expected to encounter limits in societies 
where the economic downturns have considerably stronger effects in the living 
conditions of citizens, as these are expected to be more responsive to economic 
fluctuations. On the other hand, the political system in Uruguay resembles those 
of the USA and UK in the sense that it has few, stable and long-standing political 
parties, high levels of party institutionalization (for regional standards) and rather 
stable party preferences. Uruguay’s party system since democracy was reestab-
lished in 1985 is constituted by three main parties: Frente Amplio (a center-left 
coalition party in office since 2005), and the Partido Colorado and Partido Na-
cional (both center-right parties which have already governed together in post-
electoral coalitions, despite historical rivalries). Gonzalez’s (2010) seminal work 
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on the Uruguayan party system established that it was constituted by two elec-
toral blocs: Frente Amplio on one side and the Partido Colorado with Partido Na-
cional on the other. Partido Nacional and Partido Colorado’s history dates back to 
the 19th century, hence they are called «Traditional Parties». These two electoral 
blocs – Frente Amplio (FA) and Traditional Parties (TP) – represent most of the 
Uruguayan electorate (91% of the 2014 national election). Thus, the analysis will 
focus exclusively on partisans of both electoral blocs. In the context of its party 
system, Uruguay constitutes a very likely scenario for the political conditioning of 
economic perceptions.
However, Uruguay differs from the former in terms of its macroeconomic fun-
damentals and recent economic history. Not only does Uruguay have a consider-
ably low per capita income – less than half that of the USA and UK – but its econ-
omy strongly depends on international prices, mostly commodities, which makes 
it vulnerable to global economic downturns (while making their rulers more likely 
to be judged by chance rather than merit, see Campello and Zucco, 2016). Regard-
less of whether Uruguay’s economic performance is a factor of merit or chance, its 
overall economic position is important because in less stable economies, partisan 
contamination of voters’ economic evaluations have proved to be much less likely 
(Evans and Andersen, 2006). As Visconti (2017; p. 3) posits: «Citizens from lower 
socioeconomic contexts should be more sensitive to changes in their income than 
citizens from developed countries because these events are likely to have a more 
meaningful effect on their living conditions». Furthermore, the main antecedent 
study on the relation between economic perceptions and partisanship in Uruguay 
concluded that partisanship does not affect Uruguayans economic views (Luna, 
2002) while evidence of economic vote in Uruguay has been illustrated in a few 
studies (Queirolo, 2013; Carlin et al., 2015). Overall, Uruguay is a suitable scenario 
to test whether the argument holds in a more volatile economic environment.
HYPOTHESES
Two main hypotheses are outlined below. Notably, the core idea of the first hy-
pothesis is to approximate to the actual effect of party identification in economic 
perceptions, that is, to obtain a picture of the differences in the economic judg-
ments of Uruguayan’s two electoral halves. I maintain that the economic percep-
tions of Uruguayans strongly differ in the functioning of their party identification.
H1: Regardless of the state of Uruguay’s economy, individuals identified with 
the incumbent party evaluate the economy as significantly better than those iden-
tified with opposition parties.
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The second hypothesis is rooted in the importance of using a more nuanced 
measure of party attachments. Specifically, I argue that economic perceptions of 
Uruguayans not only differ by the direction of their partisanship, but also by the 
strength of their attachment.
H2: For government partisans, the strongest their party attachment more fa-
vorable sociotropic economic perceptions they will hold. In turn, for opposition 
partisans, the strongest their party attachment, the worst sociotropic economic 
perceptions will be held.
METHOD
Firstly, a descriptive time-series analysis was used to picture the dimension of 
the differences in economic perceptions produced by partisanship and to contrast 
them with objective macro-economic indicators, specifically GDP per capita and 
the unemployment rate.
Secondly, I aggregate the time-series data and use ordered logit models with 
time fixed-effects to estimate more accurately the influence of partisanship direc-
tion and strength on economic perceptions within several time periods. A first set 
of models aimed at describing the effect of partisanship direction on economic 
perceptions while controlling for a set of sociodemographic variables, both before 
(2001–2005) and after (2005–2019) Frente Amplio was in office. Specifically, the 
model is as follows (Equation 1): 
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time (Wooldrige, 2010; Mummolo and Peterson, 2018). The fixed effects were set at the semester 
level to ensure enough observations in each time point to allow sufficient variance to test more 
complex models, including the effect of partisanship strength. Since the dependent variable is an 
ordinal scale, the specification assumes an ordered logit model. The dependent variables assume 
three possible values of economic evaluation, namely: positive, neutral, or negative. 
Next, a second set of models were used aimed at estimating the effects of partisan direction and 
partisan strength. Again, two models were estimated, one for Partido Colorado’s administration 
and one for the Frente Amplio governments. The second set of models is written as follows 
(Equation 2): 
where β1 is the effect of a categorical variable (to allow non-linear effects) of all possible 
combinations of party identification and strength. For Partido Colorado’s administration the party 
identification and strength variable has ten possible values, strong, moderate and leaners 
identifiers of each party (Partido Colorado, Partido Nacional and Frente Amplio), as well as 
Independents (regardless of the partisanship strength, which in its vas majority was none). For 
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2001 to 2019. This is an extraordinarily rich data set, which includes 102 nation-wide face-to-face 
surveys (19 during PC´s administration and 83 during FA´s administration), with all data points 
drawn from a representative sample of the country’s population and implies no house-effect. The 
series presents sociotropic economic perceptions measured by the question: “How would you 
characterize the current economic situation of the country in general?” Very bad (1); Bad (2); Neither 
good nor bad (3); Good (4); Very good (5), disaggregated by party identification and the strength of 
the attachment.  
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝,





where β1 is the effect of a categorical variable (to allow non-linear effects) of all 
possible combinatio s of party identificati n and strength. For Partido Colorado’s 
administration the party i entificati n nd strength variabl  has ten po sible 
valu s, strong, moderate and leaners identifiers of each party (Partido Colorado, 
Partido Nacional and Frente Amplio), as well as Independents (regardless of the 
partisanship strength, which in its vas majority was none). For Frente Amplio’s 
administrations it has seven possible values: strong, moderates and leaner iden-
tifiers of each electoral bloc (Traditional Parties and Frente Amplio), as well as 
Independents.
DATA
The data for the time-series analysis was from the consultancy firm Equipos 
Mori, for the period 2001 to 2019. This is an extraordinarily rich data set, which 
includes 102 nation-wide face-to-face surveys (19 during PC’s administration and 
83 during FA’s administration), with all data points drawn from a representative 
s mpl  of the country’s population and implies no house-effect. The ser es p e-
sents sociotropic economic perceptions measured by the questi n: «How would 
you characterize the current economic situation of the country in general?» Very bad 
(1); Bad (2); Neither good nor bad (3); Good (4); Very good (5), disaggregated by 
party identification and the strength of the attachment.
Party identification was measured with a 1 to 5 closeness scale. The exact 
wording of the question was: «Regardless f who you voted for or plan to vote for, 
how do y u feel about the following parties?» The available answers included: Very 
distant (1), Distant (2), Neither distant nor close (3), Close (4), and Very close (5). 
Given the changes and current structure of the Uruguayan party system, its clas-
sification of the electorate was divided into 1) before and 2) after Frente Amplio 
(FA) become the party in office in 2005. The first data point is from 2001 – at this 
time Partido Colorado (PC) was in office governing in a post-electoral coalition 
with Partido Nacional; however, Partido Nacional left the coalition soon after. 
As a result, I only include those who identified with Partido Colorado as «govern-
ment partisans» before 2005. Thus, for this period party identification was coded 
as follows: those who feel close to Partido Colorado or to both PC and Partido 
Nacional (PN) were identified as «Colorados», those who feel close only to FA as 
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«Frentamplistas», those who feel close only to PN as «Nacionalistas», and those 
who did not feel close to any party as «Independents».
However, as González (2010) suggested, the 2004 election was a landmark for 
the Uruguayan party system as it consolidated the division in two main electoral 
blocs: Frente Amplio and Traditional Parties (TP). Thus, for the post-2005 period, 
party identification was coded as follows: those who feel close only to the FA were 
identified as «FA partisans», those who feel close only to the PN or the PC – or 
those who feel close to both of them (but not to FA) – as «TP partisans», and those 
who did not feel close to any party as «Independents».
Furthermore, each survey included (previous to the closeness scale) a ques-
tion to measure the strength of party identification. The exact question wording 
was: «People think differently about political parties. Do you consider yourself a strong 
sympathizer of a party, just a sympathizer or do have no defined sympathies toward 
a party?» The coding was as follows: Strong sympathizer (1), Sympathizer (2), No 
defined sympathies (3). Next, I combined the closeness scale with partisanship 
strength and created a new variable which classified FA partisans and TP parti-
sans into strong identifiers, moderates, and leaners based on their responses to 
the partisanship strength question. This was done to grasp the strength of party 
identification at an individual level.
SOCIOTROPIC ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS AND MACRO-ECONOMIC 
INDICATORS
The time span studied (2001-2019) is of particular interest as it includes sig-
nificant changes both in objective economic conditions and in the political party 
in office. Uruguay suffered one of the most severe economic crises of its history in 
2002, yet 2004 to 2014 was a period of exceptional growth. Moreover, the shifts 
in power from the Partido Colorado to the Frente Amplio provides an interesting 
scenario given that if party identification indeed shapes economic perceptions, a 
change in government from one electoral bloc to another should cause an inver-
sion in who holds more favorable views of the economy, from the former govern-
ment partisans to the new government partisans.
Figure 1 plots the mean economic evaluations disaggregated by party identifi-
cation and recoded as the two main electoral blocs – FA partisans and TP partisans 
– and Independents for each survey1. Several interesting patterns emerge from 
1 For simplicity and n size, Figure 1 groups Colorados and Nacionalistas as TP partisans. This can be 
problematic for the pre-2005 period as PN left the governing coalition in 2003. This was addressed in 
the models presented in the following section.
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Figure 1. Firstly, it shows that both electoral blocs’ and Independents’ economic 
perceptions roughly move in tandem with each other. There are not long periods 
in which trends diverge. Furthermore, this movement in the aggregate seems to 
be quite consistent with some macro-economic indicators, specifically, as Figure 
2 shows, Uruguayan’s economic perceptions move similarly to GDP per capita and 
the unemployment rate. For instance, the worst economic evaluation means for 
every electorate’s subgroup lies at the beginning of the series around 2002, when 
Uruguay’s economy was in crisis and, coincidently, GDP per capita was at its lowest 
while unemployment was at its highest. Despite some punctual deviations (such as 
the exaggerated pluming of economic perceptions after 2015), it may safely be said 
that Uruguayans respond to real economic trends.



























Partisanship FA partisans Independents TP partisans
Notes: Series were smoothed with a loess regression plotted with 95% confidence 
intervals. The vertical line indicates when Frente Amplio administration began. Data is 
from 102 national representative surveys from 2001 to 2019 with number of respondents 
varying from 700 to 2000. Question asked was «How would you characterize the current 
economic situation of the country in general?» Very good (1); Good (2); Neither good nor bad 
(3); Bad (4); Very bad (5).
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Equipos Consultores.
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Source: Author’s elaboration with data from World Bank and Instituto  
Nacional de Estadística.
Nonetheless, a significant difference in the economic evaluations can be seen 
between both electoral blocs along the whole series and is quite powerful. The 
means of economic evaluations during Partido Colorado’s administration (2001 
and May 2005 in the data collected) were as follows (with standard deviations in 
parentheses): 3.6 (0.3) for TP partisans, 4.1 (0.2) for FA partisans, and 3.9 (0.3) for 
Independents, who thus lie in-between the two partisan groups. This is particularly 
interesting as most of that PC administration – the 2001 to 2004 period –, was 
unambiguously bad as Uruguay was immersed in the most severe economic crises 
of its recent history (with the unemployment rate over 15%). Even in this context, 
economic perceptions differ quite strongly by partisanship.
In addition, during Frente Amplio’s administrations the partisan gap increased 
even more. Objectively, from 2004 to 2011, Uruguay experienced unprecedented 
economic growth amidst the commodities boom: the unemployment rate fell from 
16.9 in 2003 to just 6.6 in 2011 and GDP per capita doubled from 2004 to 2014. 
Nevertheless, this period of unquestionable economic success was not accompa-
nied by homogeneously positive economic evaluations; notably, TP partisans’ per-
ceptions show that they failed to recognize it. For instance, the mean economic 
perceptions of TP partisans during the 2005–2011 period was 3.3 (0.3), that is, 
their economic judgments were between «neither good nor bad» and «bad». This 
result is quite revealing given that in 2004 and early 2005 – when the economic 
trend mildly reversed but the nation remained under Battle’s administration – 
the average TP partisans’ economic perception was 3.4 (0.2), a figure surprisingly 
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similar to the average during the extraordinary growth period during the adminis-
trations of the Frente Amplio.
On the other hand, FA partisans’ economic perceptions improved significantly, 
especially early on in their first terms. During the FA’s administrations, difference 
in the mean economic perceptions between blocs (shown in Figure 1) were as high 
as 1.1 (on the 1 to 5 scale) and 0.7 on average. For instance, the FA’s series peaked 
at the end of 2009 with 62% of FA partisans holding positive economic judgments 
against just 23% of TP partisans.
In any case this data suggest that Uruguayans do not respond to the economy. 
On the contrary, in the aggregate, they mostly do. Real economic indicators trends 
are, for most of the series, similar to those of both electoral blocs’ perceptions. 
However, partisan bias operates over those trends. When the real economic trend 
is favorable, government partisans tend to experience a more positive change in 
their evaluations than opposition partisans. Conversely, when the real economic 
trend is unfavorable, opposition partisans tend to experience a more positive 
change in their evaluations than government partisans. More importantly, looking 
at a single data point from the series illuminates the large heterogeneities in each 
electoral bloc’s economic perceptions.
Overall, although no causal inferences are drawn from this data, it is safe to 
assume (and consistent with the expectations summed up in H1) that the time-se-
ries analysis shows how, no matter the actual economic performance, government 
partisans (Frente Amplio or Partido Colorado) have consistently better economic 
evaluations than opposition partisans. Despite the fact that the series of both elec-
toral blocs’ economic perceptions generally move in tandem with real economic in-
dicators, there are significant differences between them, with some periods dem-
onstrating such large differences among electoral blocs that it appears as if two 
different countries were being evaluated.
THE EFFECT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION ON ECONOMIC 
PERCEPTIONS
In the previous section I presented descriptive statistics to uncover differenc-
es in economic evaluations of partisan direction and their movement in relation to 
macro-economic indicators. In this section, I aggregate the time-series data at the 
individual level to estimate a set of ordered logit models that allow for the control 
of the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents while testing the statis-
tical significance of the differences in economic evaluations by partisan direction 
within specific time points.
Table 1 contains ordered logit estimates of the effect of party identification on 
economic perceptions as in Equation (1) for the PC administration and the three 
| 79 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 9, 1 (2020), 67-88
OPERTTI
STOIC PARTISANS. THE POLITICAL CONDITIONING OF ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS IN URUGUAY
FA administrations. Consistent with H1, passing from Independent to PC partisan 
had a positive and statistically significant effect on economic perceptions while 
PC was in office. Conversely, when FA was in office, TP partisans held significantly 
worse economic perceptions than Independents. Meanwhile, for FA partisans, 
the effect is the opposite: during the PC administration, FA partisans’ economic 





Party ID (reference 
category = 
Independent)
Coefficients Odds Ratios Coefficients Odds Ratios
PC partisan 0.95*** (0.05) 2.59 [2.35 2.87] - -
PN partisan 0.53*** (0.05) 1.69 [1.53 1.87] - -
TP partisan - - -0.42*** (0.02) 0.66 [0.63 0.69]
FA partisan -0.75*** (0.04) 0.47 [0.44 0.51] 1.15*** (0.02) 3.17 [3.06 3.29]
Female (1=yes) -0.17*** (0.03) 0.84 [0.79 0.90] -0.38*** (0.02) 0.69 [0.67 0.71]
Age (years) -0.01*** (0.00) 0.99 [0.99 1.00] 0.00*** (0.00) 1.00 [1.00 1.00]
Education (reference 
category = Elementary 
school)
Middle school -0.03 (0.06) 0.97 [0.87 1.09] 0.12*** (0.02) 1.13 [1.08 1.18]
High school -0.04 (0.06) 0.96 [0.85 1.09] 0.32*** (0.02) 1.38 [1.32 1.44]
Higher education -0.00 (0.07) 0.99 [0.88 1.13] 0.65*** (0.02) 1.92 [1.84 2.02]
Semester fixed effects Yes Yes
Constant cut1 0.30 (0.10) 0.20 (0.06)
Constant cut2 2.82 (0.11) 2.39 (0.08)
Observations 18,985 61,993
Notes: The first cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Odds ratios are reported in the second column with 95% CI in brackets. 
Semester fixed effects were supressed to save space. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Equipos Consultores.
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perceptions were significantly worse than those of independents while, when their 
party was in office, their evaluations became significantly more positive than those 
of Independents.
Despite the significant differences in the economy’s evaluation between each 
partisan group and Independents, the magnitude of the differences seems larger 
for government partisans than for opposition partisans. Table 1 shows how in both 
administrations the (positive) effect of being a government partisan in economic 
evaluations is larger than the (negative) effect of being an opposition partisan. 
However, further research is needed to determine whether this a regularity and 
uncover its causes.
In order to convey the magnitude of party identification’s effect on economic 
perceptions, Table 2 shows the predicted probabilities of holding a negative eco-
nomic perception by partisanship in the second semester of 2004 and the second 
semester of 2005 – the semesters before and after FA took office. Predicted prob-
abilities were estimated for a typical respondent using modal characteristics for 
education and gender and the mean for age. Consequently, the hypothetical re-
spondent is a 45 years old female with a middle school education. Predicted prob-
abilities for typical respondents in each semester were included in Figure A1 and 
A2 in the online appendix, available at the journal’s website. Important to note is 
that Table 2 presents two interesting patterns. Firstly, it shows how differently 
each partisan group may evaluate the economy; for instance, before the 2005 
election, the probability of having a negative economic perception for FA partisans 
was almost twice as large as for PC partisans. Secondly, Table 2 shows the drastic 
inversion of economic perceptions in a strikingly short period of time. Despite real 
Table 2. Predicted probabilities for a typical respondent of holding a negative 
economic perception by party identification previous and after FA
Second semester 2004 Second semester 2005
PC partisan 0.396 [0.368 0.423] TP partisan 0.664 [0.643 0.684]
PN partisan 0.501 [0.474 0.528]
Independent 0.629 [0.608 0.651] Independent 0.565 [0.544 0.587]
FA partisan 0.771 [0.765 0.797] FA partisan 0.291 [0.273 0.309]
Note: Table entries were estimated after Models 1A and 1B and 95% confidence intervals 
are between brackets. Predicted probabilities were calculated for a typical respondent 
(46 years old female with a middle school education) with semester fixed effects to those 
indicated on each column.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Equipos Consultores.
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economic indicators show a mildly better economic situation in this period, PC and 
PN partisans’ probabilities of holding negative economic perceptions significantly 
increased from 2004 to 2005. In turn, FA partisans dramatically improved their 
economic perceptions when FA took office for the first time in the party’s history. 
The evidence in Table 2 shows how deeply which party is in office can affect parti-
sans’ sociotropic economic perceptions.
ADDING THE STRENGTH FACTOR
In their seminal work, «The American Voter» Campbell et al. (1960) suggested 
that the stronger the party attachment, the stronger the bias. To empirically test 
this claim, I estimated the effect not only of partisan direction but also partisan 
strength on economic perceptions in Uruguay in my sample period. Partisans of 
each of the three parties before 2005 (PC, PN, and FA) and of two blocs after 2005 
(TP-PC and PN combined and FA alone) were divided into strong, moderate, and 
leaners. The results of estimating Equation (2) before (Model 2A) and after (Model 
2B) FA took office are presented in Table 3.
Again, to convey the magnitude of the effects of partisan strength, predicted 
probabilities were estimated after Models 2A and 2B. Each panel in Figure 3 shows 
the predicted probabilities of holding a negative economic evaluation by partisan di-
rection and strength within each semester during the PC administration. The x axis – 
from left to right – shows the estimates from strong partisans of the party in office to 
strong opposition partisans. Consistent with H2 and Campbell et al.’s (1960) claim, 
I found that the stronger the party attachment, the stronger the partisan bias. In 
every semester, strong PC partisans had a significantly lower probability of holding a 
negative economic perception than Independents, FA partisans, PC moderates, and 
leaners. The right side of each panel shows how strong FA partisans is the elector-
ate’s subgroup with the higher estimated probability of holding a negative economic 
evaluation. Although the partisan strength effect is not as straightforward as for PC 
partisans, the evidence demonstrates that different strengths of party attachments 
produce significantly different economic evaluations.
Figure 4 plots predicted probabilities of positive economic evaluations for all 
the combinations of party direction and strength by semester during FA’s adminis-
trations. Also consistent with H2, this pattern is opposite to that in Figure 3: strong 
FA partisans have a higher probability of holding a positive economic evaluation 
while strong TP partisans have the lowest. Figure 4 also sheds light on the possible 
differences among partisans of a single party depending on the strength of the at-
tachment. For instance, at certain points, strong FA partisans were twice as likely 
to hold a positive economic assessment than leaners.
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Party ID and strength 
(reference category = 
Independent)
Coefficients Odds Ratios Coefficients Odds Ratios
Strong PC 1.33*** (0.09) 3.79 [3.21 4.48] - -
Moderate PC 0.95*** (0.07) 2.60 [2.26 2.98] - -
Leaner PC 0.53*** (0.09) 1.69 [1.41 2.03] - -
Strong PN 0.61*** (0.08) 1.84 [1.56 2.18] - -
Moderate PN 0.50*** (0.07) 1.65 [1.45 1.88] - -
Leaner PN 0.47*** (0.10) 1.60 [1.33 1.93] - -
Strong FA -0.93*** (0.06) 0.39 [0.35 0.44] 1.61*** (0.03) 5.00 [4.76 5.25]
Moderate FA -0.69*** (0.05) 0.50 [0.45 0.56] 0.99*** (0.02) 2.70 [2.57 2.82]
Leaner FA -0.44*** (0.08) 0.65 [0.56 0.75] 0.65*** (0.03) 1.91 [1.79 2.03]
Strong TP - - -0.60*** (0.03) 0.55 [0.51 0.58]
Moderate TP - - -0.30*** (0.03) 0.74 [0.70 0.78]
Leaner TP - - -0.37*** (0.03) 0.69 [0.65 0.73]
Female (1=yes) -0.17*** (0.03) 0.85 [0.79 0.90] -0.38*** (0.02) 0.68 [0.66 0.71]




Middle school -0.06 (0.50) 0.97 [0.87 1.09] 0.10*** (0.02) 1.11 [1.06 1.15]
High school -0.04 (0.07) 0.97 [0.85 1.10] 0.29*** (0.02) 1.34 [1.28 1.40]




Constant cut1 0.29 (0.11) 0.12 (0.08)
Constant cut2 2.83 (0.11) 2.33 (0.08)
Observations 18,726 61,993
Note: The first cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Odds ratios are reported in the second column with 95% CI in brackets. 
Semester fixed effects were supressed to save space. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Equipos Consultores.
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities for a typical respondent of holding a negative 
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Notes: From left to right: Strong PC partisans, PC moderates, PC leaners, independents,  
PN leaners, PN moderates, strong PN partisans, FA leaners, FA moderates  
and strong FA partisans.
Table entries were estimated after Models 2A and 95% confidence intervals are between 
brackets. Predicted probabilities were calculated for a typical respondent (46 years old 
female with a middle school education) with semester fixed effects to those indicated  
on each panel.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Equipos Consultores.
Overall, Figures 3 and 4 show not only that there can be sizable differences 
among partisans of the same party depending on the intensity of their identifica-
tion but too that these effects are not necessarily linear. For instance, along each 
semester of FA’s administration, strong TP partisans hold significantly worse eco-
nomic perceptions than moderates and leaners, but there were no statistically sig-
nificant differences among moderates and leaners. By the same token, differences 
between strong FA partisans and moderates were usually larger than differences 
between moderates and leaners; therefore, the null hypothesis for H2 can only be 
partially rejected. Thus, overlooking partisanship strength while studying partisan 
bias can hide high levels of variance among partisans of the same party, and this 
can hinder drawing conclusions about partisan behavior
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities for a typical respondent of holding a positive 
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Notes: From left to right: Strong TP partisans, TP moderates, TP leaners, independents,  
FA leaners, FA moderates and strong FA partisans.
Table entries were estimated after Models 2B and 95% confidence intervals are  
between brackets. Predicted probabilities were calculated for a typical respondent  
(46 years old female with a middle school education) with semester fixed effects  
to those indicated on each panel.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Equipos Consultores.
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DISCUSSION
This article makes three major contributions to the literature on the relation 
between economic perceptions and party identification. First, the analysis of eval-
uating economic perceptions disaggregated by party identification for a long-time 
span in Uruguay provides an understanding of possible heterogeneous economic 
perceptions within the same country, despite the electorate’s response to real 
economic changes in the aggregate. Regardless of whether economic activity was 
disastrous or prosperous, government partisans held significantly better economic 
perceptions than Independents, while opposition partisans’ evaluations were sig-
nificantly worse. The deeper point here is that this study thus shows the large de-
gree of differences that can exist between partisans. At some points, the probabil-
ity that government partisans would positively evaluate the country’s economy 
was almost three times higher than for Independents.
Additionally, the large timespan of the aggregated data allows the identifica-
tion of two different interesting patterns. First, partisan bias seems to operate 
more strongly for government partisans than for opposition partisans, regard-
less of which particular political party is in office. Put differently, the difference in 
economic evaluations between independents and opposition partisans – although 
usually statistically significant – is not nearly as large as the difference between 
government partisans and independents. However, further research is needed on 
this issue. Also, data gathered before and after a change in the party in office il-
luminates the quickness with which the economic perceptions of different parti-
sans can invert. Between the last semesters of 2004 and 2005, former government 
partisans and latter opposition partisans’ economic perceptions slumped – even 
amidst real economy growth – while new government partisans’ probability of 
holding a positive economic perception increased 2.5 times over.
Second, this article tests the existence of political conditioning of economic 
perceptions in an almost unexplored region such as Latin America. Contrary to 
previous research (Luna, 2002), evidence demonstrates that party attachments 
have a pervasive effect on Uruguayans economic perceptions, providing a richer 
specification of the mechanism by which the control variable of party identifica-
tion operates in the estimation of economic vote findings in Uruguay (e.g. Queirolo, 
2013; Carlin et al., 2015). By testing the influence of party identification in Uru-
guay’s electorate, the article extends the argument to an intriguing case. Uruguay-
ans were not expected to maintain largely politically biased economic perceptions 
given that more unstable economies were expected to generate more responsive 
individuals not so powerfully affected by political conditioning (Evans and An-
dersen, 2006). Time-series analysis unveiled how Uruguayans roughly respond to 
actual economic trends in the aggregate but with significantly different baselines 
conditioned by partisanship. Furthermore, despite the country’s vulnerability to 
exogenous economic shocks and the recent memory of one of the most severe 
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economic crises in Uruguay’s history, Uruguayans largely make politically biased 
economic judgments. Finally, the results of this article support Carlin, Singer and 
Zechmeister’s (2015) claim that Latin American voters are not that different from 
the American or European voter, as partisan bias in economic perceptions in Uru-
guay resembles that of previously studied cases.
Lastly, the present results show the importance of taking into account not only 
partisan direction but also partisan strength when studying partisan bias, a feature 
largely overlooked by the previous literature. Using time-series aggregate data re-
vealed sufficient observations for testing the differences in economic evaluations 
among strong, moderate, and leaner partisans. Ultimately, the evidence from the 
Uruguayan case shows that economic evaluations vary significantly depending on 
partisanship strength – notably, at some given points, these differences were quite 
large. This more nuanced picture of partisan groups provides a better understand-
ing of the dimension of partisan bias. Treating strong partisans, moderates, and 
leaners as if they are the same can be problematic given the large differences that 
can arise among them. Furthermore, while at some moments the effect of partisan-
ship strength was quite linear, at others strong identifiers strongly differed from 
moderates and leaners. These patterns may be of particular importance for evalu-
ating the normative consequences of the political conditioning of economic per-
ceptions. There is a substantial difference between having rather small, strongly 
biased groups at one extreme of the partisan continuum and less variation among 
the rest of the electorate and having large differences between partisan groups 
that each represent a large part of the electorate.
The fact that party identification largely shapes economic perceptions has sev-
eral empirical and normative consequences. Although the political conditioning of 
economic perceptions, and other political issues, may foster stability by allowing 
elected parties an initial margin to carry out their intended measures (Enns et al., 
2012), other implications are rather negative. The manipulation of objective condi-
tions to make them fit into previous political conceptions can impact real-life indi-
vidual non-political decisions. For instance, there is evidence that suggests that in 
the United States consumption change following a presidential election is corre-
lated with a county’s partisan complexion (Gerber and Huber, 2009).
Although the fact that individuals seemed to respond to real economic trends 
in the aggregate relativizes negative normative consequences, probably the most 
notable consequence of reversing the causal arrow between economic percep-
tions and political behavior is that it undermines one of the pillars of democracy: 
electoral accountability. Scholars have long and rightfully argued about the up-
sides of party system stability, particularly in volatile political contexts such as Lat-
in America (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), yet little research into the downsides of 
enduring party identifications has been undertaken. If a considerable share of vot-
ers that maintain a party attachment form their economic judgments as a function 
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of its political identification (which research shown is largely influenced by the so-
cialization process), the ability of the electorate to hold politicians accountable for 
their performance is severely weakened. Furthermore, it allows political actors to 
influence economic perceptions (Evans and Andersen, 2006). And, the influence 
of party attachment in individual’s judgments are not restricted to the economic 
sphere. Conversely, there is evidence that party identification conditions other rel-
evant issues such as healthcare evaluations (Tilley and Hobolt, 2011), credibility of 
electoral polls (Kuru, Pasek and Traugott, 2017) or social security (Bartels, 2002), 
suggesting a rather bleak scenario for electoral accountability in a significant part 
of the electorate.
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